Prior to the passing of a 22-year-old female from Winnipeg, an alert was triggered by the plasma collection machine indicating that the procedure should be halted. Unfortunately, this alert was disregarded, and she subsequently experienced cardiac arrest.
Following the death of Rodiyat Alabede, her family received unedited documents from Health Canada, including inspection reports and a medical overview of the incident in October of last year, when she donated plasma at the Grifols Plasma Donation Centre on Taylor Avenue in Winnipeg.
The documents highlighted the failure of Grifols technicians to stop the plasma collection as instructed by the machine, according to Katherine Lanteigne, a safe-blood advocate representing Alabede’s family. Lanteigne mentioned that multiple alerts were ignored, which if acted upon, could have potentially saved her life.
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Allegations of negligence before Alabede’s demise have left her family deeply distressed and angered, as expressed by Lanteigne, who urged Health Canada to reinvestigate the circumstances surrounding her death.
According to Health Canada documents, during Alabede’s plasma donation, the machine issued four alerts, with a fifth alert documented in Grifols’ internal investigation report, indicating a rapid increase in vein pressure.
Subsequent to this final alert, where Alabede exhibited signs of distress, including loss of consciousness and convulsions, the procedure was temporarily halted.
Despite earlier alerts prompting termination of the plasma collection as per standard practice, this action was not taken, as revealed in the unedited inspection following Alabede’s passing on October 25, 2025, at the Taylor site.
The alerts listed in the inspection document indicate that they occur when vein pressure reaches its maximum or rises too quickly, as outlined in a Grifols memo sent to all Canadian staff on December 5, post Alabede’s demise. The memo instructed staff to adhere to specific guidelines when such alerts are triggered, including termination if the return pressure exceeds 40 millimeters of mercury at a zero milliliters per minute return rate.
However, Health Canada documents revealed that the procedure resumed when the return pressure hit 52 millimeters of mercury. A compliance verification report from December 22 indicated that staff
